DE LA RECHERCHE À L'INDUSTRIE









# ELECTROMAGNETIC FAULT INJECTION: TOWARDS A FAULT MODEL ON A 32-BIT MICROCONTROLLER

**Nicolas Moro**<sup>1,3</sup>, Amine Dehbaoui<sup>2</sup>, Karine Heydemann<sup>3</sup>, Bruno Robisson<sup>1</sup>, Emmanuelle Encrenaz<sup>3</sup>

#### <sup>1</sup> CEA

Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives

#### <sup>2</sup> ENSM.SE

Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Saint-Etienne

#### <sup>3</sup> LIP6 - UPMC

Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris 6 Université Pierre et Marie Curie

FDTC 2013 – AUGUST 20, SANTA BARBARA, USA



#### **MOTIVATIONS**







- Security of microcontroller-based embedded systems against fault injection attacks
- Target: ARM Cortex-M3 microcontroller
- Fault injection means: Pulsed electromagnetic fault injection
- Theoretical attacks rely on an attacker's fault model
- Electromagnetic fault injection is quite recent
- Very few in-depths studies of the effects on complex systems
- → Better understanding of the effects of EM fault injection
- → Detailed fault model at a register-transfer level











- I. Experimental setup
- II. General approach
- III. Study of the injection parameters
- IV. Register-transfer level fault model
- V. Conclusion




### **FAULT INJECTION ATTACKS**









- Several physical ways to inject faults into a circuit's computation
- Necessary for an attacker to know the type of injected faults

| Fault target    | Data, instructions                         |
|-----------------|--|
| Fault type      | Bit flip, reset at 0, set at 1, stuck      |
| Granularity     | Bit, byte, word                            |
| Determinism     | Deterministic, metastable, random          |
| Temporal aspect | Single piece of data/instruction, multiple |



### **EXPERIMENTAL SETUP**







#### Pulsed electromagnetic fault injection

- Transient and local effect of the fault injection
- Standard circuits not protected against this technique
- Solenoid used as an injection antenna
- Up to 200V sent on the injection antenna, pulses width longer than 10ns



- Frequency 56 MHz
- -16/32 bits **Thumb2** RISC instruction set
- ARMv7-M modified Harvard architecture
- SWD link to debug the microcontroller



### **DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL**








- Experiment driven by the computer
- Execution of a computation on the target device
- Sending of a voltage pulse
- Stop of the microcontroller
- Harvesting of the microcontroller's internal data
- Analysis of the obtained results

### Main experimental parameters

- Position of the injection antenna
- Electric parameters of the pulse
- Injection time of the pulse
- Executed code on the microcontroller











- I. Experimental setup
- II. General approach
  - III. Study of the injection parameters
  - IV. Register-transfer level fault model
  - V. Conclusion




### **GENERAL APPROACH**









| Output pieces of data | Detail   |
|-----------------------|--|
| R0 to R12             | General-purpose registers  |
| R13 (SP)              | Stack pointer  |
| R14 (LR)              | Link register  |
| R15 (PC)              | Program counter  |
| XPSR                  | Program Status Register - Flags - Details about the triggered interruptions - Details about the execution mode |
| Result                | Memory address that contains the calculation's output  |



### COO SIMULATION OF A FAULT MODEL








#### **Instruction skip simulation**

| IT         | Ligne_assembleur          | <u> </u>            | Detail_IT 💌 | Adresse 🔽 | RO 💌       | R1 ▼       | R2 💌       | R3         | R4 💌       | R5    |
|------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------|
| Thread_mod | e                         | 1                   | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x3        | 0x2        | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x08000224 6803 LDR r3, | ,[r0,#0x00] N       | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x7[FAUTE] | 0x2        | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x08000226 4423 ADD r3  | 3,r3,r4             | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x2[FAUTE] | 0x2        | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x08000228 6003 STR r3, | [r0,#0x00]          | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x2[FAUTE] | 0x2        | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x0800022A F1010101 ADD | r1,r1,#0x01         | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x4[FAUTE] | 0x2        | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x0800022E 2902 CMP r1  | L,#0x02             | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x1[FAUTE] | 0x20000421 | 0x1[FAUTE] | 0x1[FAUTE] | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x08000230 DBF6 BLT 0x  | :08000220           | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x3        | 0x2        | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x08000220 F8524021 LDR | r4,[r2,r1,LSL #2] N | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x2[FAUTE] | 0x1[FAUTE] | 0x400 |
| Thread_mod | e 0x08000224 6803 LDR r3, | ,[r0,#0x00] N       | None        | None 🔨    | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x3        | 0x2        | 0x400 |
| Thread mod | e 0x08000226 4423 ADD r3  | 3,r3,r4 N           | None        | None      | 0x2000040c | 0x2        | 0x20000421 | 0x1[FAUTE] | 0x2        | 0x400 |
|            |                           |                     |             |           |            |            |            |            |            |       |

### **Experimental measurements**



■ Two lines are equal ⇔ R0 to R12 + XPSR + result + SP + PC are equal




### COO SIMULATION OF A FAULT MODEL







### **Example of simulation of a 16-bit instruction replacement**



- Very long for an exhaustive simulation over the whole instruction set
- Two lines are equal ⇔ R0 to R12 + XPSR + result are equal









- I. Experimental setup
- II. General approach
- III. Study of the injection parameters
  - IV. Register-transfer level fault model
  - V. Conclusion


### CO INFLUENCE OF THE ANTENNA'S POSITION










- Green: hardware interrupts have been triggered
- : faults on the output value have been obtained













Frequency 56 MHz – Pulse width 10 ns – Pulse voltage 190V – Period 17ns









- Target instruction: single LOAD instruction that loads 0x12345678 into R8
- 20 ns time interval, by steps of 200 ps 3 mm square, by steps of 200 µm
- Variable increase of the Hamming weight of the loaded piece of data
- No fault on other registers than R8 (except for very few faults on R0)




#### INFLUENCE OF THE INJECTION TIME







### Example of temporal cartography on an addition loop



#### **Observations:**

- One power of two has not been added
- BusFault or UsageFault interrupts
- → Does our fault injection have an effect on the data flow or the control flow?

#### Test program:

loop to sum the elements of an array that contains eight powers of two 3.5 µs, by steps of 200 ps

#### **Expected result:** 0xFF

```
addition_loop:

ldr r4, [r2,r1, ls1 #2]; r4 = array[i]

ldr r3, [r0,#0]; r3 = result

add r3, r4; r3 = r3 + r4

str r3, [r0,#0]; result = r3

add r1, r1, #1; r1 = r1 + 1

cmp r1, #8; r1 == 8?

blt addition_loop
```



## COO INFLUENCE OF THE PULSE'S VOLTAGE







#### **LDR R4, PC#44** with 0x12345678 at the address PC#44

| Pulse voltage | Output value      | Occurrence rate |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| 172V          | 1234 5678         | 100 %           |
| 174V          | <b>9</b> 234 5678 | 73 %            |
| 176V          | FE34 5678         | 30 %            |
| 178V          | FFF4 5678         | 53 %            |
| 180V          | <b>FFFD</b> 5678  | 50 %            |
| 182V          | <b>FFFF 7F</b> 78 | 46 %            |
| 184V          | FFFF FFFB         | 40 %            |
| 186V          | FFFF FFFF         | 100 %           |

- Simulation : corresponds to no instruction replacement
- Looks like a set at 1 fault model on the Flash memory data transfers
- Possible precharge of the data bus on this architecture









- I. Experimental setup
- II. General approach
- III. Study of the injection parameters
- **▶ IV. Register-transfer level fault model** 
  - V. Conclusion

# CEZ FAULTS ON THE CONTROL FLOW







- Experiments with a sequence of NOP (BF 00)
- Four kinds of faults
  - Fault on R7
  - The program does not stop
  - UsageFault exceptions (Invalid Instruction / No Coprocessor)
  - Fault on R0
- Sometimes a modification of the number of executed cycles
- Simulation on the ISA: some instructions can explain the results
- Some faults only equivalent to a STR R0, [R0, #0] instruction

**NOP - BF00** 1011 1111 0000 0000 **NOP - BF00** 1011 1111 0000 0000

**STR R0, [R0, #0] - 6000 0110 0000** 0000 0000 **NOP - BF00** 1011 1111 0000 0000










#### **Normal behaviour**












#### With an electromagnetic fault injection






### COO DATA LOAD FROM THE FLASH MEMORY







#### Normal behaviour






### COO DATA LOAD FROM THE FLASH MEMORY







#### With an electromagnetic fault injection





### **OVERVIEW OF THE DEFINED FAULT MODEL**







## → Possible to fault the transfers from the Flash memory

### Consequences regarding the instruction flow

- Instructions replacements
- Instruction skips under certain conditions (~ 20-30% of time)
- Some instructions may be more sensitive than others
- Some registers seem to be more sensitive than others

### Consequences regarding the data flow

- Corruption of the LOAD instructions from the Flash memory (encryption keys,...)
- Some metastability phenomena, but deterministic under some conditions
- Faulty values with higher Hamming weight (on this architecture)









- I. Experimental setup
- II. General approach
- III. Study of the injection parameters
- IV. Register-transfer level fault model
- V. Conclusion

# COORCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES







- A first attempt of fault model for EM fault injection on a 32-bit μC
- Corruption of the transfers from the Flash memory on the buses
- The obtained effects seem very similar to the ones obtained with clock glitches or other fault injection means
- Similar effects obtained previously on a very different architecture (Atmel AVR ATmega128 8-bit microcontroller)
- Possibility to perform instruction skips under some specific conditions

#### **Perspectives**

- Use more advanced debug techniques to understand better instruction replacements
- Define a higher-level fault model that can be used for theoretical attacks





# Any questions?